Toronto Criminal Lawyers Blog

It is very important for every Canadian to understand, not only his or her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also how those rights can be enforced in a court of law. Once the court has determined that your rights under the Charter have been infringed, what remedies are available to redress the wrong you have suffered? Criminal defence lawyers and other legal professionals refer to the legal results of enforcing a Charter right as “remedies”. Under law, judges have the power to prescribe certain remedies when an individual’s rights have been breached.

There are a wide variety of remedies available under the law (declarations, damage awards, restitution, specific performance, etc.) Sometimes a Charter remedy could be as simple as a declaration that the government did in fact breach the individual’s Charter rights. In rare cases, the court may order the government to pay the individual damages. However, remedies like this are rarely available in criminal trials. When criminal defence lawyers argue the Charter in the context of a criminal trial, they have a very specific goal: to exclude evidence or obtain a stay of proceedings. Criminal defence lawyers will argue that specific rights have been infringed and apply for a remedy that will advance their client’s position.

There are two main ways a criminal defence lawyer may use the Charter in the context of a criminal trial: (1) to argue that the law his or her client has been charged with breaking is unconstitutional or (2) to argue that the investigation or arrest of his or her client was carried out in an unconstitutional manner. There are various remedies available to the Court that respond to these two lines of argument, and further the defence lawyer’s ultimate goal avoiding a client’s conviction. These remedies can be found in sections 52, 24(1), and 24(2) of the Constitution Act of 1982 (which contains the Charter).

In situations where the criminal defence lawyer is arguing that his or her client was charged with breaking a law that is itself unconstitutional, he or she will seek a remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act of 1982. Section 52 states that “the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.” If a law is declared “… of no force or effect” by the court, the law is no longer operational and the offence it created no longer exists in Canadian law. Naturally, a court cannot find an individual guilty of an offence that does not exist. Thus, if the criminal defence lawyer successfully convinces the court that the law is unconstitutional and it chooses to render the law inoperable under s. 52, the accused must be acquitted.

The s. 52 remedy is uncommon in criminal proceedings and criminal defence lawyers will only seek it in exceptional circumstances. That said, it has been used successfully in the past. When a remedy is granted under s. 52, it not only ensures that the accused individual goes free, it also changes the state of Canadian law. One famous example is the decision in R. v. Morgantaler. Henry Morgentaler is a Canadian doctor and pro-abortion activist. He was arrested in 1983 for performing illegal abortions. During the course of his trial he argued that the law against performing abortions violated the Charter. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed, declaring the law of no force and effect and acquitting Mr. Morgentaler. The decision of the Supreme Court effectively prevented the government from creating any statutory restrictions on abortion in Canadian law. This controversial ruling had a strong and lasting effect on Canadian society.

Generally speaking, criminal cases that deal with s. 52 remedies are lengthy and complicated. Often, if a defendant wishes to pursue a remedy under s. 52, they do so because they feel that more than just their own liberty is at stake. Defendants in these cases are often crusaders who want to change what they perceive to be an unjust law. Other examples of s. 52 cases include R v. Malmo-Lavine where the defendant, a self-proclaimed “marijuana/freedom activist”, successfully argued that the laws against possession of marijuana for medical purposes were unconstitutional, and R. v. Zundel where infamous holocaust denier, Ernst Zundel, successfully argued that the law against “spreading false news” in the Criminal Code was unconstitutional. In both cases the defendants were facing criminal charges (possession of marijuana and “spreading false news” respectively) and were able to avoid criminal conviction by invoking the protection provided in s. 52 of the Charter. However, they also had political motivations for pursuing a s. 52 remedy. Finally, they were accused with crimes which dealt with morally and politically controversial issues  (abortion, legalization of marijuana, freedom of speech). Recently. the prostitution laws have been challenged under the same provision. This recent challenge deconstructs the present anomoly that while it is illegal to solicit sex in a public place it is perfectly legally to advertise escort agencies that offer sexual services.

Unlike the remedy in s. 52, which is available where the defendant seeks to challenge a statute or law, the remedies in s. 24 are available where a defendant seeks to challenge an action taken by the government during the course of an investigation or prosecution. Section 24 creates specific remedies for defendants whose rights have been infringed by a specific act that can be attributed to the state. It is far more common for criminal defence lawyers to apply for a remedy pursuant to s. 24 than attacking the constitutionality of a law. Section 24 of the Charter applies to situations where the investigation or prosecution is manifestly unreasonable or unfair. Section 24 contains two remedies. Under s. 24(1), the defendant can apply to the court for any remedy the judge considers appropriate if his or her Charter rights have been breached. Under s. 24(2) an individual whose rights have been breached can apply to the court to have evidence excluded from his or her trial. Both of these remedies are key tools to aid defence lawyers in securing a successful result for their client.

According to s. 24(1), “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”. This provision gives the judge a lot of discretion in deciding what remedy to use. However, for an individual facing criminal charges the most advantageous remedy ordered under s. 24(1) is a “stay in proceedings”. The s. 24(1) “stay” remedy effectively puts an end to the trial against the defendant. Although, technically the prosecution may be reinstituted within a one year period, generally speaking, it rarely is.  The Crown would only reinstate the proceedings if the police found new and extremely compelling evidence against the accused. Otherwise, a stay effectively ends the trial. Though the accused is not technically acquitted, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. C.I.P. that a stay of proceeding is “for all intents and purposes, an acquittal”. A “stay of proceedings” does not constitute a criminal record and is viewed by  defence lawyers as a successful ending to the prosecution.

A remedy may be granted under s. 24(1) for a breach of the accused’s legal rights found in ss. 7 through 14 of the Charter. Practically speaking, the remedy is only really applicable to breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10 or 11.

If any of these rights have been interfered with to such a degree that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the court were to continue in the proceedings against the defendant, the court will impose a stay of proceedings under s.24(1). Such behaviour on the part of the state constitutes an abuse of process and the courts will not allow the trial against the accused person to continue.

There are several alternate remedies the court may apply under s. 24(1) if the abuse of process does not meet the threshold required for a stay. The nature of the remedy is left to the trial judge to determine. The judge must consider the following factors when crafting an appropriate remedy.

The judge must fashion a remedy that promotes both the purpose of the right being protected and the purpose of s. 24(1).

Section 24(2) follows some of the same principles as s. 24(1); however, it applies specifically to Charter breaches that occur during the collection of evidence. If evidence is collected in a manner that infringes the Charter, the defendant can apply to the court to have that evidence excluded from the trial under this section. Section 24(2) does not contain an automatic exclusionary rule corresponding to every Charter breach. The court will only exclude evidence under s. 24(2) where, to do otherwise, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. When evidence is excluded from trial, it cannot be used by the Crown to prove the accused guilty. It will not be shown to the jury (if there is one) and the trial judge cannot consider it when making his or her decision.

Generally speaking, there is no need for a causal connection between the Charter infringing conduct and the discovery of the evidence. In other words, the defence does not have to prove that the Crown could not have obtained the evidence without breaching the Charter. It is sufficient for the defence to prove that there is a temporal connection between the collecting of the evidence and the Charter breach.

Section 24(2) states that “where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”.  Once the defence has established that the Charter was breached and that the breach was temporally connected to the piece of evidence in question, the defence lawyer must argue that the evidence ought to be excluded under s. 24(2). Generally speaking, the court must be satisfied that admitting the evidence at trial would undermine the reputation of the justice system in the mind of a reasonable member of the community who is dispassionate and fully apprised of all the circumstances.

Recently, in R. v. Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a test to determine whether to admit the evidence at trial. According to the court, when a judge is faced with a Charter application for exclusion under s. 24(2) the court must consider and balance the following factors:

1. The seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct

2. The impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and

3. Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

At the first stage, the court must ensure that the admission of the evidence does not send the message that the justice system condones serious state misconduct. At stage two, the court must be sure not to admit the evidence if it will send the message that the court will countenance police conduct which deliberately ignores individual rights and liberties. At the final stage the court is asked to consider society’s interest in having the trier of fact consider all of the evidence in determining an individual’s culpability.

The section 24(2) remedy is often used to exclude physical evidence, confessions, and bodily samples (DNA, fingerprints). The purpose of the remedy is to maintain the reputation of the administration of justice in the eyes of the Canadian community. It is imperative that the justice system actually upholds the principles underlying the Charter and protects the specific rights enshrined in the Charter. Through application of the s. 24(2) remedy, the court ensures that individuals are not convicted of a crime in a situation where the government or their agents has deliberately ignored the principles enshrined in the Charter.

At Kostman and Pyzer, Barristers we have made successful applications for Charter remedies available pursuant to sections 24(1) and (2). Proceedings have been stayed and evidence excluded on the basis that our client’s rights have been infringed.

There is no place on Canadian soil where individuals have less constitutional protection than at an international airport. The government and the courts have determined that overriding concerns for effective law enforcement, security, and national sovereignty are more important than the protection of Charter rights in the airport context. Section 1 of the Charter allows the government to limit Charter rights as much as is reasonably justified in a free and democratic society. For all intents and purposes, the court has ruled that it is reasonably justifiable to limit Charter rights against search and seizures to facilitate customs and security at an international airport. This limitation of freedom applies only in the context of international flights. When you are flying domestically, Charter rights apply to you the same way as they do anywhere else in the country. However, when you are flying between countries, the protection afforded by the Charter is severely limited.

There are three levels of airport security. Primary inspection occurs at customs. A custom officer will ask an individual questions about his or her travel plans. The individual has no constitutional rights in this context. He or she cannot legally refuse to answer the question. If he or she does so, the airport has a right to detain the individual.

Secondary inspection consists of a search of any luggage the individual is carrying. The officer need not demonstrate any reasonable ground for suspicion to search an individual’s belongings. It is perfectly legal for airport officers to conduct random and arbitrary bag searches. In fact, random searches are seen as a prudent technique airport officers may use to discover evidence, prevent smuggling, and deter smuggling.

A skin search or body search is also considered to be a form of secondary search. Te only criteria preceding such a search is that it be approved by a senior airport officer. Individuals facing such a search are protected by one constitutional right: the s. 10 right to counsel. This protection is available so that a criminal defence lawyer can advise you that the strip search cannot legally be conducted without the permission of a senior airport officer. Beyond that, there is very little a criminal defence lawyer can do to help you protect your privacy when you face a search of this kind. Moreover, ndividuals in this situation are not awarded protection by the other Charter rights such as the s. 8 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Body searches, like bag searches, may be conducted at random by airport officers. In any other context an officer would have to meet the criteria set out in R. v. Golden before exercising his or her discretion to conduct a body search. However, in the airport context no such justification is necessary.

Finally, tertiary search consists of a body cavity search. Among other things the officer conducting the search must show that he or she has a “high level of justification” for conducting the search. Though the Supreme Court of Canada is not clear about the meaning of the term “high level of justification”, most criminal defence lawyers, Crown Attorneys and judges in the lower court agree that this translates to reasonable and probable grounds approaching certainty that the search will reveal evidence.  For more information on the legal requirements the police must meet before exercising their discretion to conduct a body cavity search see out blog Searching the Person. In lieu of conducting a body cavity search, airport officers may detain the individual until natural circumstances force them to expel the bags from their body. Based on the ruling in R. v. Monney, the airport can hold an individual for at least seven hours in a detention cell, known as a “drug-loo room”, to wait for him or her to expel the evidence. However, the maximum amount of time airport officials may hold an individual is unclear in the current case law.

Only approximately 15% of individuals who are strip or cavity searched in the airport are found to be carrying contraband. This means that 85% of people are unnecessarily degraded under the current system. Criminal defence lawyers are using every option available to them to try to change the law so that it better protects your privacy. However, given the rationale behind the lack of constitutional protection at the airport, it is unlikely that the rules regarding search at the airport will be relaxed in the near future.

This guest post is contributed by Stephanie DiGiuseppe. She can be reached at stephaniedigiuseppe@gmail.com.

The G20 summit has brought our world’s most powerful leaders to Toronto. Discussion topics for the summit relate to international finance and development. Toronto will be hosting leaders from the United States, North Korea, South Korea, France and Germany, and that is just to name a few. Throughout the summit the world will be watching Toronto. The concentration of power and attention creates an ideal platform to advocate for a notable cause.  Many protesters will take the opportunity to amplify their voices and be heard on the world’s stage.  Will Canada’s Charter of Rights of Freedoms serve as a barrier between these protesters and potential criminal charges?

Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees everyone the fundamental freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including the freedom of the press and other media of communication. The purpose of this guarantee was defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Keegstra.  The three core reasons the right to freedom of expression is important are;

1. 1) To ensure the free flow of ideas in a democratic society
2. 2) To ensure free debate in order to allow truth to prevail in the market place of ideas
3. 3) To ensure citizens’ ability to self realize through expression is not restricted

Any expression that furthers the aim of any of these three purposes will be aggressively protected by the Charter. The topics protesters seek to bring attention to are likely to fall under one of the three types of speech listed above. An expression includes any kind of activity that conveys, or attempts to convey meaning. All forms of expression, except for violence, are protected.  The expression of protesters at the G20 summit will only be protected by the Charter if the chosen form of expression is non-violent.  Protesters are not permitted to throw things at passers-by, assault people or damage property.  Protesters who choose to participate in violent forms of expression will not be protected by the charter.

In Reference re Public Service Relations Act, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that although the freedom on peaceful assembly is a separate and distinct right, it is closely related to the freedom of expression.  Sections 2 (c) of the Charter, guarantee everyone the fundamental freedoms of (c) peaceful assembly.  The right to assemble is recognized as a human right, a political freedom and a civil liberty. The freedom allows citizens to assemble in public places in the context of a protest. Gathering together in a large group for a peaceful protest is a protected Charter right.

However, neither of these guaranteed freedoms is absolute.  The limitation on all our rights is set out in Section 1 of the Charter which states; “

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The scope of a person’s right is limited by the rights of others. The rights of individuals to assemble and express must be balanced against the right of society to peacefully enjoy public places. Before taking the opportunity granted during summit, be sure you know the scope of your rights, and their limits.  For example section 63 (1) of the Criminal code states;

63. (1) An unlawful assembly is an assembly of three or more persons who, with intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or so conduct themselves when they are assembled as to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, that they

(a) will disturb the peace tumultuously; or

(b) will by that assembly needlessly and without reasonable cause provoke other persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.

Lawful assembly becoming unlawful

(2) Persons who are lawfully assembled may become an unlawful assembly if they conduct themselves with a common purpose in a manner that would have made the assembly unlawful if they had assembled in that manner for that purpose.

This section makes it a criminal offence for people to gathered together to conduct themselves in a way that will cause an atmosphere of violence. An atmosphere of violence can be created by yelling threats, charging or creating loud noises.  Protesters do not have to participate in violent behaviour themselves to cause an atmosphere of violence. Also, the fact a group of protesters intended to lawfully assemble for a peaceful assembly is irrelevant. It is made clear by section 63(2) that a lawful protest can turn into an unlawful protest if three or more people in the group conduct themselves in way that creates an atmosphere of violence.  Regardless of the reason you have gathered together downtown during the G20 you should refrain from yelling threats, charging or pushing others and throwing things. These types of acts are likely to cause a fear of violence in those around you. The freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter is limited by the right of others not to walk the streets in fear.  Even spectators and innocent bystanders must behave during the G20.  Section 65 of the Criminal Code, states;

Everyone who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

This section makes it a criminal offence to participate in any conduct that will cause an atmosphere of violence. A riot is a disturbance of public peace that is disorderly, noisy, and turbulent.   When a spectator observes protesters throwing rocks, picks one up and joins in, they can be charged under section 65. A spectator can be charged under this section for participating in non-violent activity such as, marching or making loud noises, provided the groups conduct as a whole can be classified as a riot.

It is still a criminal offence to cause a disturbance when the nature of disturbance cannot be classified as a riot. According to the Canadian Criminal Code, causing a disturbance is a criminal offence. Section 175(1)(a) provides:

175. (1) Everyone who, not being in a dwelling-house, causes a disturbance in or near a public place,

(i) By fighting, screaming, shouting, swearing, singing or using insulting or obscene language,

(ii) By being drunk, or

(iii) by impeding or molesting other persons,

is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

This section creates an offence that further limits the way protesters can lawfully express themselves. During the G20 summit the public’s ability to enjoy peace and tranquillity in public places will limit protesters ability to express their concerns.  A disturbance occurs when the ordinary peace and behaviour that can be expected in a location is disrupted.  When the crowd at the perimeter fence is calmly observing, protesters ought to refrain from trying to get the crowd rowdy. Encouraging others in the crowd to engage in violent behaviour and damage property will cause a disturbance. Protester should refrain from aggressive behaviours, such as yelling obscenities, which may entice those around them to participate in disruptive behaviour.  Peacefully protesting at the G20 summit is lawful and unlikely to cause a disturbance.  Protesters are encouraged to march, hold signs and banners, and sing songs. It is important to remember that your freedom to assemble and express yourselves is not absolute. There are limits on the forms of expression protesters can lawfully engage in. If you or anyone you know has been charged with an offence relating to the G20, contact Kostman and Pyzer to ensure your rights are protected.

On June 2, 2010 through an order-in-council, the Ontario government secretly approved new sweeping powers for the police. Many Toronto criminal lawyers believe that these ‘police state regulations’ have gone too far and are inconsistent with Canadian civil liberties and the rights enshrined by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These new police powers allow the  Toronto Police Service and other police agencies to arrest and even jail individuals who refuse to produce identification or be searched within five metres of the security zone implemented for the G20 Summit being held in Toronto. The new measure carries a penalty of up to two months in jail or a $500 fine upon conviction. These new police powers were enacted without any prior announcement or public consultation. The obvious concern is that many Torontonians could walking the street without identification and unknowingly breaking the law by going within five metres of the newly erected security fence. All Toronto criminal lawyers and civilians should be concerned about secret laws and the government’s changing our rights without even telling its citizens. If you have been charged with an offence as a result of the Ontario government’s new measures, immediately contact a skilled criminal lawyer to find out what your rights are. These new sweeping police powers can, and will be, challenged. Toronto criminal lawyers, Kostman and Pyzer, will defend your rights to be protected from unlawful searches, seizures and arrests. Contact us today at 416-658-1818 for a free consultation.

There are two essential stages to any challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the first stage, the claimant, working with his or her criminal defence lawyer, must show that it is more likely than not that his or her Charter rights were breached. In the second step the burden of proof switches to the Crown, and the Crown must show that it is more likely than not that the breach was justified under s.1 of the Charter.

Section 1 of the Charter limits all of the other rights in the Charter. It states that “[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” If the government passes a law that breaches the constitution, they can invoke s. 1 to argue that the breach is nonetheless justified in a free and democratic society.

Section 1 contains two requirements that the government must satisfy to show that the Charter breach is justified. In the first step the government must show that the breach is “prescribed by law”. This is a normally straightforward threshold criterion that basically requires that the limit have the “form of law”. In essence, it serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the number of instances where an infringement can be upheld. To be “prescribed by law”, the rule must be accessible and intelligible to the citizen. Both values fall under the more general concept of notice: to be “prescribed by law” the rule must be promulgated. In R. v. Therens, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what is meant by the requirement that the rule be “promulgated”; the rule will be “promulgated” and thus “prescribed by law” within the meaning of s. 1, if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from the application of a common law rule.

To be prescribed by law, the law must be “intelligible”, which means that citizens must be able to understand the effects of the law, including the nature of the behaviour which would constitute a breach of the law. This means that the law cannot be overly vague. However, courts have preferred to deal with the claim that a restriction is too vague or too broad at stage 2 of the s. 1 inquiry. In Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), the Supreme Court explained that vagueness has s. 1 significance in two ways: (1) a law may be so uncertain as to be incapable of being interpreted so as to constitute any restrain on government power. In these circumstances there is no “limit prescribed by law” and no s. 1 analysis is necessary because the threshold has not been met and (2) a law which passes the threshold test may, nevertheless, by reasons of imprecision, not qualify as a reasonable limit. This concept will arise under part two of the test.

At stage 2 the government must justify that the breach is “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. In 1986 in R. v. Oakes the Supreme Court of Canada formulated a test that the government must follow to prove that this requirement is met. At the first step of the Oakes Test, the government must show that there was a “pressing and substantial purpose” behind the law. In other words, the objective of the law must be of sufficient importance considering that the law has the effect of limiting an individual’s Charter rights. Though the court has said that the standard at this first step must be high to ensure that trivial objectives are not protected, in practice, the court rarely finds that the restriction fails the first step.

The second step of the Oakes test is a proportionality test. This step has three substeps – all of which the government must address. First, the government must show that the law was carefully designed to achieve the objective identified in step 1 of the Oakes test. The law must be fair and not arbitrary. The limit it imposes must be “rationally connected” to its objective.  For example, if the government were to make a law against visiting South America, and then identify their objective as “protecting endangered species”, the court would likely find that the law was not rationally connected to its purpose since visiting South America has little to do with the general goal of protecting endangered species. Though the purpose of protecting endangered species would likely be considered “pressing and substantial” under part 1 of Oakes, the law against visiting South America would not be a clear and effective way of protecting that objective. At the second sub- stage of the proportionality test, the government must show that the law is minimally impairing. In other words, the law must be designed to limit the rights and freedoms of Canadians as little as reasonably possible. The law against visiting South America in our example from before would also fail at this stage of Oakes. There are other ways to protect endangered species that limit individual freedom much less than the law proposed in this example. For example, the government could ban imports of goods made using endangered species. Thus, the law against visiting South America would be seen as much to harsh, impairing, or limiting. At the final substep of the proportionality test the government must show that there is proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”. Even if the government establishes that there is an important objective, the severity of the limit may be so great as to outweigh the benefit. This test operates on a sliding scale; the more severe the deleterious effects of the measure, the more important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In our South America example, it would be clear that the law was extremely limiting on people’s freedom, yet the degree to which it accomplished the purpose of protecting endangered species was small (people, other than Canadians, could still harm endangered species in South America). The law would be seen as disproportionately harsh compared any benefit it could be expected to create.

Know your rights. Contact Kostman and Pyzer, Barristers, if you need a Toronto criminal lawyer or are charged with a criminal offence.

In the controversy surrounding Tiger Wood’s recent driving accident, it has been rumored that Mr. Wood’s blood tests from the hospital revealed that he had consumed alcohol, prescription drugs and sleeping pills before his now-infamous car crash. However, because the police did not request a breathalyzer at the scene of the accident, the media speculates that the blood samples taken from Tiger at the hospital will not be admissible against him in a court of law, should he be charged with an offence arising out of the accident.

If the same thing were to happen in Toronto, would the blood samples be admissible against Tiger Woods assuming he was charged with impaired driving? According to Canadian law, the blood samples obtained from Tiger at the hospital would be admissible in a Canadian court if and only if certain preconditions are met.

Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that every individual has the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The testing of an individual’s breath, urine, or blood constitutes “search or seizure” under the law. In order for the police to obtain the sample without violating section 8 of the Charter, they must establish that the search/seizure is reasonable under the law and obtain a search warrant.

The police would have to obtain a search warrant in order to lawfully obtain the samples. A search warrant must be obtained from a judge. A judge will grant a search warrant if he or she finds that, based on the information contained in an application known as a “sworn information”, the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the individual was impaired at the time of the accident. Thus, one of officers investigating the Woods collision would have to file a “sworn information” stating that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that Tiger Woods was impaired at the time of the accident. The officer would also have to include a description of the evidence on which he or she formed that belief. The information cannot be based on the results of the blood, urine or breath test. It would be unfair if the police could use the results of the test in order to obtain permission to obtain those results. Thus, the officer must provide independent grounds on which he or she suspects that alcohol or a drug was involved in the collision. For example, if the officer or any witness smelled alcohol on Mr. Wood’s breath, if the hospital or ambulance staff reported smelling alcohol on Mr. Woods, if empty alcohol containers were found in Mr. Wood’s car, if witnesses described Mr. Wood’s behaviour as indicative of intoxication, etc., these factors would provide evidence to support a search warrant request. The judge would then determine whether the sworn information contained sufficient reliable evidence to issue a warrant.

Even if the officer obtains a warrant, the bodily samples taken from the accused will be inadmissible under s. 8 of the Charter if the defence can prove that they were taken without the accused’s consent, prior to the issuing of the warrant, for no purpose other than evidence collecting. If the samples were taken for legitimate health reasons, the police can obtain them after-the-fact pursuant to a warrant without breaching the Charter. However, the police cannot ask the doctor to take the samples and then go get a warrant. This would constitute a breach of the accused’s Charter rights. In the recent case of R. v. Grant the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly stated that “forcible taking of blood samples” will almost always breach the Charter. If the police were to have a nurse or doctor take the samples from the accused for police purposes, this would likely constitute a forcible taking (as the accused is tricked into giving the sample) and the sample would not be admissible at trial. However, if the samples are taken for legitimate health reasons, there is no reason that they would not be admissible after the fact, so long as the officer can persuade a judge that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was impaired, and obtain a search warrant.

Once the Crown has established that the taking of the samples did not breach section 8 of the Charter, the Crown must prove that the samples are a true representation of Tiger’s Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) at the time of the accident. To do this, they must establish timing and continuity of the samples.

Under normal circumstances, the Crown benefits from a presumption that the BAC measured in the samples corresponds to the accused individual’s BAC at the time of the offence. In order to benefit from this presumption, the Crown must prove a number of things. For example, two samples must be taken, they must be taken within two hours of the offence, they must be taken “as soon as practicable”, there must not be any unreasonable time delay between the samples, the samples must have been taken by a qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician under the supervision of a doctor, and the samples must be placed directly in approved containers. A number of these conditions may have been lacking in the Woods case. For example, there may have been unreasonable delay between the accident and the taking of the samples, they may not have been taken within the two-hour window, and they may not have been secured directly into an approved container. For this reason, it is unlikely that the Crown will benefit from the presumption. Therefore, the Crown will have to prove that Mr. Wood’s BAC at the time the samples were taken was the same as Mr. Wood’s BAC at the time of the offence. For example, Tiger Wood’s defence lawyer could argue that Mr. Woods consumed the impairing substances right before driving, and that there was not enough time between consumption and driving for the effects of the substances to set in. The Crown will have the burden of disproving this argument.

Proving continuity means proving that the particular bodily samples being entered into evidence did, in fact, come from Mr. Wood’s body and that they have not been tampered with. Under usual circumstances, continuity is presumed because the samples are taken in the police station and immediately sealed and taken to the Center for Forensic Science where they are tested. However, since hospital samples may not have been officially sealed, continuity will be more difficult to prove. The Crown will have to call every individual who handled the samples prior to their collection by the police, as witnesses. In R. v. Katsigiorgis, the court ruled that it is not a violation of s. 8 for the police to seal the samples prior to obtaining a search warrant, in order to preserve continuity. However, there is no evidence that the police did this in the Tiger Wood’s case.

If the Tiger Woods incident occurred in Toronto and the police were able to prove reasonable grounds, obtain a search warrant, establish that the samples were taken for legitimate medical reasons, and establish timing and continuity, the samples would be admissible in a court of law. As the case played out in Florida, the Florida police released a statement saying that they did not suspect any foul play before the rumors about Tiger’s blood samples began to circulate. Assuming the exact same facts occurred in Toronto, this press release would make it extremely unlikely that the Toronto police could obtain a search warrant and seize the samples. This is because, by admitting that they did not suspect foul play, the police admitted that they did not suspect that Tiger was impaired. In other words, they admitted that they did not have reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a search warrant. Thus, if Tiger was indeed impaired at the time of the accident, the evidence of impairment would not be admissible at trial, whether that trial occurred in Florida or Toronto.